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1. Introduction.
In the first part of this editorial [1], we examined the notion of democracy within the Chinese and American
political cultures. Here we argue that because the Chinese system contains an element also common to the
American one, factionalism, it will inevitably evolve under the impact of the Internet to become more
democratic in practice. However, it will not necessarily become more similar to the American system.
2. Factionalism in the Two Systems:
In the preceding editorial I stated that the Chinese believe the American multi-party system camouflages the
control of economic elites and that, through the system of financing elections, these economic elites ensure
candidates who support their perspectives are far more likely to be elected.
However, the Chinese perspective overlooks one virtue of the two-party system and a major defect in one-
party politics: the dominant party, if lacking an opponent to call them on their mistakes and outright
peculations, easily and, possibly inevitably, becomes arrogant and corrupt [2].
In the Chinese case, the ties of family, locale, and dialect often produce political groups similar to “machines”
in American politics. These local elite groups often make it impossible for Chinese national policy to be
implemented at local levels. At present, for example, the national government of China has clearly decided
that the country must stop relying on an export-driven economy, and is providing funding to ease the
transition to alternative domestic markets. However, elite groups tied to export-oriented industries often
dominate local and provincial governments. These groups have misused such funding in an attempt to
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strengthen local export industries in direct opposition to national policies [3].
This problem of the political influence of local elites is not new in the Chinese system. Prior to the modern era
the imperial government had one inviolable practice in the elaborate Confucian civil service system: “The Rule
of Avoidance.” The Rule absolutely prohibited posting a bureaucrat such as a local Magistrate or even a
Provincial Governor-General to his home province, where he would invariably be corrupted or hamstrung by
the local ties mentioned above.
It is true that the old society could become incredibly corrupt, but this was much more likely at the Imperial
Court than in the Civil Service system itself. The Confucians usually avoided conspicuous spending and
displays of wealth and emphasized an almost puritanical simplicity. What they wanted was power, and
corruption was a hindrance to gaining and holding power.
Additionally, Confucians genuinely believed that good government flowed from basic Confucian principles and
that factionalism—such as the interference of local elites—was not only an evil, but also a fatal flaw in policy
[4]. The Confucian bureaucracy, then, was intended to be a unitary one, not one torn by differing
interpretations of basic values or policies. To be charged with factionalism at the Imperial Court would result
in banishment, physical punishment, or execution.
In this regard, the Confucians had a very different perspective than did the American Founding Fathers,
though Americans too, initially saw factionalism as an evil. This classic American sentiment comes from
James Madison’s The Federalist No. 10, “The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction
and Insurrection” [5].
Madison believed factionalism evil, but inevitable [6]. It could be prevented—in his words—only by removing
its causes, which lay in human nature: There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the
one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
The Communist Party agrees with Madison in that it also thinks factionalism is inevitable, at least at the initial
stage in the policy-making process. Democracy, in the sense of a multiplicity of opinions and outright
factionalizing, is permissible only while the Party is forming policy. This involves a period of closed-door Party
discussions, replicated at lower levels of the system as various alternatives are examined [7]. However, once
policy is announced from the top, factional disagreements can be met much as the Confucians would; that
is, with violence, if gentler methods of suppression fail [8]. The Party, in short, attempts in Madisonian terms
to quell factionalism by giving “…to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.”
This analysis may seem both antiquarian and overly theoretical. However, it is clear that Communism was
able to supplant Confucianism in China because, in many regards, the two are very similar. This should not
surprise us. Both systems had to be appropriate to the Chinese historical and cultural context in order to
survive and become dominant. Confucianism itself repeatedly evolved to meet new historical circumstances;
so has Communism.
The Confucians, like the Party, believed that good policy comes fundamentally from moral and ethical
agreement. To disagree with the dominant policy was literally immoral. The most common basis for political
attacks then, was to charge that the opposition was corrupt or dishonest or, in some manner, violating the
Confucian value system. This avoided the charge of factionalism because it cloaked itself as a defense of
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core Confucian values. Because shared values remain critically important within the current system, this
political tactic will remain necessary and useful [9].
This means that changing the basic political line or orientation in either the traditional or contemporary
Chinese system was and is very difficult. Creating the pressure to do so implies or requires factionalism. The
safest way to remove powerful political opponents is still to catch them in corrupt behavior.
3. How the Internet Facilitates Chinese Democracy
This game of charging corruption, however, has always been a closed process. Officials, Confucians or
Communists, could play it. The people could not—they lacked both information and influence upon policy.
These discussions were closed ones, dominated by totalitarian forces, whether the Emperor or the Party
Central Committee. These kept the discussions and factionalism safely within bounds. The people did, at
various times, violently force new policies upon their leaders in a desperate attempt to force the government
to deal with unbearable suffering at local levels.
To argue that the present Chinese system functions exactly or largely like the imperial system is, of course,
naïve. There are countless new factors at play which the Confucians had never faced. It was their failure to
find solutions to new problems, after all, which resulted in decades of turmoil and ultimately, the founding of
the People’s Republic in 1949.
Now that government also faces new challenges. Looming large among these are the forces of globalization,
including the Internet. The Chinese people, like all of us, now live amidst complex production chains, global
markets, interdependent fiscal systems, and instantaneous digital communications systems.
There are many examples of the political use of the Internet in China. Here we will ignore the international
aspect, wherein internal Chinese issues quickly become noted globally, and focus upon local internal ones. It
is noteworthy that many of these are, as we would expect, related to moral or ethical issues, particularly
those facing children and family—these are the issues to which Chinese leadership is particularly sensitive
[10]. And in a country with 100 million blogs and 290 million Internet users, these issues immediately become
nationally known [11].
Other issues which quickly go viral on the Internet in China deal with local groups who are not using the
Internet so much to condemn national government or party officials, but instead to call attention to local
incidents which violate national policies. These frequently include collusion between local elites and industries
resulting in local harm to the environment or health, or misuses of political power to quell local labor
disturbances. Sometimes these incidents seem relatively minor, but determined participants—outraged
relatives of alleged victims, for example—can quickly make them a regional or national issue [12].
Some Internet issues, of course, amount to attacks on national policy, or are driven by local ethnic issues.
These, if seen to be driven by foreigners, have frequently resulted in nationalist outbursts by Chinese both at
home and abroad condemning foreign reports which are often felt to be politically motivated or outright
incorrect, whether deliberately so or not. This reaction to foreign interference has produced a new and
strident Internet-enabled nationalism among some so-called “Angry Youth” [13].
The Chinese government has tried, of course, both to stifle the spread of such information and to manipulate
it to their advantage. However, the critical issue is not that there are attempts at suppression, but the fact
that such suppression is now necessary. In even the recent past, local issues had to grow to a sometimes
staggering scale or local abuses of power had to become truly outrageous before authorities were forced to
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focus on them at all.
The Chinese government has few good choices in such situations. Local and national officials can and often
do try to suppress news of the events, but if these do leak—and if they are of any scale or importance, they
will, thanks to the Internet—then the government looks worse than it would have if it had dealt with such
issues properly at the outset.
We do not have direct insight into internal Party discussions over such local questions, but it is easily inferred
from the almost inevitable punishment of local authorities that bad policy is seen as just that, and condemned
[14]. These events are certainly producing factional reactions in inner governmental circles, and the trend is
clearly for the government to be more and more transparent and open. This is inevitable; a failure to deal with
issues quickly becomes a factional issue. It could also result in being condemned as neglecting corruption at
the local level, hinting at personal corruption. The government is still far, of course, from meeting the more
extreme demands of idealists both at home and abroad for transparency and the rule of law. But the
momentum is for becoming more open, and this trend is irreversible. The very fact that issues which could
earlier be safely ignored now must be discussed internally creates a system that functions increasingly like a
democracy, in the sense that various factions are heard, and conflicts are compromised.
This is not to say that China will necessarily evolve into a two-party system, or that it should. As Thomas
Friedman recently pointed out in The New York Times, the centralized nature of one-party control, autocratic
or not, gives the Communist Party the power necessary to “…impose the politically difficult but critically
important policies needed to move a society forward in the 21st century” [15]. We must necessarily wonder,
given the disarray of the American system and the stultifying partisanship of entrenched interests, if the
American two-party system has the equivalent will and power to do the same.
We also think that it is ultimately in the interest of democracies in general and the idea of “democracy” in
particular for there to be a wide variety of differing types of democracies in various stages of evolution. The
recent crises in free-market capitalism have shown not only weaknesses in Western democracies (which are
finding it difficult to act against entrenched interests) but the strengths in Eastern ones (which can do so
because of a more unitary heritage).
4. Conclusion
Political systems, to be stable, must reflect history and culture in both their forms and functions. The
American and the Chinese systems differ markedly, especially in form, but it is difficult to claim that the
multiparty system is superior to a one-party system in which factions may be so prominent as to be
recognizably consistent in membership and policy inclinations. Chinese history and culture is capable of
producing a system democratic in function, is doing so at the present, and will inevitably continue do so
under the impact of the Internet.
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